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Handling Proliferation 
Pierre Laszlo 
Abstract: The ethics of the chemist identify with those of the citizen, in prin-
ciple. The observed perversions, such as proliferation of chemicals, stem from 
the values of a chemical community closed upon itself, and from the attendant 
identification of a mere know-how with a science. The epistemic degradation 
produces moral indifference. 
Keywords: ethics, activism, alchemy, discovery, know-how, plagiarism. 
Introduction 
The issue of ethics in chemistry is obscured by prejudices. A professional 
chemist is clearly guilty of criminal behavior whenever s/he perverts her or 
his expertise to make addictive and illegal drugs for illicit profit. To blame the 
whole profession for such a lapse is unwarranted. Every profession has its 
black sheep.  
  There are also chemists alienating their moral judgment and accepting to 
do work for the military (chemical weapons), or for a corporation (chemical 
formulations), with destructive effects on human and on other living beings. 
Two such examples are napalm and 2,4-T. Again, if there is rot, it affects only 
a tiny segment of the whole profession.1 And to view chemists in general as 
being morally deficient is a biased extrapolation. 
  Another form of the same obfuscation by too general a blame is chemo-
phobia. Chemists as a whole are viewed as sorcerers’ apprentices whose activ-
ity (especially if it is of an industrial nature) is pregnant with risks and may 
have  catastrophic  outcomes  (the  names  of  Basel,  Seveso,  and  Bhopal  are 
quoted), which the collective psyche lumps together with nuclear accidents 
(Three Mile Island, Chernobyl).  
  A single example will suffice as an illustration of this particular prejudice. 
I am quoting it, in my translation, from a recent book:2 
One ought to realize that, among the 40,000 chemicals most widespread in the 
world, 150 only were subjected to a full evaluation. [An OCDE 2000 report is 126  Pierre Laszlo 
then quoted to that effect.] In other terms, there exist today more than 39,000 
chemicals  whose  medium  and  long-term  effects  are  totally  unknown  and 
which nevertheless are being used all the time. 
What these various attitudes have in common, however justified or unjusti-
fied, is the direction of the outlook, from the outside of chemistry toward 
the inside. This is reminiscent of a famous saying by President Lyndon B. 
Johnson (“I’d rather have him inside of the tent pissing out, than having him 
stand outside of the tent pissing in.”) Hence, I will assume in this article a 
somewhat different, much needed stand, that from a professional chemist re-
flecting on the morality, or lack thereof, within our community. This is not 
to claim that specialized chemical knowledge endows one with authority in 
moral judgments. However, my view is that human beings individually access 
universal values about moral principles,3 that these are gradually built within 
the self from personal experience and thus ought to be something of a private 
language (which does not rule out most such private languages overlapping 
with each other to a considerable extent). I am only reiterating here the clas-
sic view that morals as such cannot be taught, can only be learned; and that 
they are learned from experience. 
  Lest it be confusing, I now outline the organization of the paper: 
(1)  the conventional wisdom (that to be found in the media) about the 
moral shortcomings of chemists is largely irrelevant; 
(2)  a more interesting issue is that of the moral duty of chemists in their 
paradigmatic activity, in their routine daily work; 
(3)  there is a problem, mirroring that of logorrhea in ordinary language, 
in proliferation of chemicals; 
(4)  proliferation of chemicals is but a sub-class of chemical plagiarism, 
which I go on to define; 
(5)  such chemical plagiarism stems from the value of know-how taking 
precedence  within  the  chemical  community  over  general  scientific 
values; 
(6)  and  I  close  with  a  plea  for  a  return  to  advancement  of  scientific 
knowledge taking priority. 
1. Chemistry creates novelty 
In this section, I deal first with the issue as seen from inside the chemical 
community. A strict criterion for editors of journals publishing chemical pa-
pers is for the submitted manuscript to contribute something novel. This is 
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unknown molecule or material; or the devising of a new (and presumably im-
proved, more advantageous) route to some molecule or material. Obviously, 
such a definition of innovation in chemistry is rife with values and thus car-
ries a moral underside to it. 
  It will be useful at this point to contrast so-called chemical creativity with 
artistic creativity. In a Gedankenexperiment, let us try and imagine Paul Cé-
zanne (say), writing, perhaps in a letter to one of his correspondents: “my 
goal is to paint a landscape and to improve on what Corot (or Delacroix or 
Géricault) had achieved.” What such an admittedly crude comparison tells us, 
from the knowledge we have of Cézanne’s intent (in particular, he aimed at 
depicting natural forms as built from elementary shapes as that of the cylin-
der or the cube; to present a landscape which, instead of being concave from 
application of linear perspective, would appear as convex, from being self-
contained and closed upon its wealth of meaning)4 is that there is indeed a 
deep difference.  
  Artistic creativity seeks to discover a new vision of the world. So-called 
‘chemical creativity’ attempts to complement the sphere of already existing 
artifacts. If pushed, a chemist may claim that this is the only way in which to 
achieve a differing worldview for his science. 
  The two kinds of creativity differ in the degree of insight to be achieved. 
Cézanne was striving for a new form of insight – which, in the opinion of 
many, he did succeed in acquiring. The run-of-the-mill chemist identifies the 
process of extrapolating (or of interpolating) from the known to the un-
known with a gain of insight, when it amounts only to an extension of rou-
tine abilities. 
  In this respect, a semantic lexical configuration, prevalent in synthetic or-
ganic chemistry, is most revealing, that of the terms ‘target molecule’, ‘selec-
tive’, and ‘specific’. It belongs to the realm, not of the admiring contempla-
tion of the wonders of nature (an acceptable definition of natural history, I 
believe), but of the action language of the successful completion of a prede-
fined task. It belongs to mission-oriented research and is historically a legacy 
of World War II and of its aspects as a scientifically-waged war: radar, peni-
cillin, operational research, jet engines, the Manhattan Project, etc. 
  Thus, one witnesses a double transformation of values. In the first such 
switch, since chemistry as a science of material transformations gives itself an 
action language, chemical activism arises. And secondly, from chemical activ-
ism stems proliferation of chemicals: activism can be defined as action for its 
own sake; activism translates into a form of acquisitiveness, i.e. ever increas-
ing the sphere of chemical knowledge, as defined (lazily) by the numbers of 
known substances and of known avenues to these. 
  At this point in the analysis, one may wish to stop and to take stock, per-
haps in order to change and to reverse the perspective. The very word ‘prolif-128  Pierre Laszlo 
eration’ is pejorative. While it is true that the number of chemical species in-
creases exponentially,5 is it indeed a feature of chemistry alone or is it more 
general? Is it worrisome, and why? 
  To raise such questions is to answer them. With respect to the first, we 
have  learned  from  demographers  the  exponential  increase  of  almost  any 
quantitative measure of any human activity, from the number of cities having 
more than one million inhabitants, to the number of aspirin tablets manufac-
tured per year, or to the number of people fed from cultivation of one hec-
tare of land. Thus, proliferation of chemicals is unexceptional and mundane. 
  Is it at least true that the more chemicals being launched into existence, 
we know less and less of their possible ill effects on living creatures? Ange-
lism might argue here that, for the last two or three decades, because of Ra-
chel Carson’s Silent Spring, to the contrary governmental organizations (such 
at the American Food and Drug Administration; or the European EC) have 
started impressive efforts at registry of chemicals. Such catalogs are devised 
so that a lay person can look-up the toxicity of any among thousands of 
chemicals, either in readily available printed format, or from electronically 
accessible data banks. 
  In this context, it is worthwhile to compare and to contrast here, in paral-
lel to my earlier contrasting of the artistic and chemical kinds of creativity, 
the creativity of the chemist with the creativity of language. In the latter case, 
a  competent  speaker  of  say  English  has  the  dual  ability  of  (i)  expressing 
thoughts which are entirely novel, such as a brand-new theorem in mathe-
matics, or a new law in economics, or a piece of poetry, from existing pho-
nemes and words; (ii) coining neologisms and new expressions to enrich the 
language.  
  The second point is well documented in history. Witness Shakespeare’s 
contributions to the language: approximately 1,700 new words, such as ‘re-
clusive’, ‘gloomy’, ‘barefaced’, or ‘radiance’,6 and a host of expressions from 
‘to send someone packing’ to ‘to be in a pickle’.7 And the first point is, obvi-
ously, empirically true. 
  I do not find that the creativity of chemistry and of language differ in 
kind; indeed I have argued elsewhere for the former to derive from the latter.8 
Hence, perversions of the former (such as the unchecked proliferation of 
chemicals, or the moronic travesty of scientific research known as ‘combina-
torial chemistry’) might usefully be related to perversions of the latter, such 
as Orwell’s Newspeak or the use and abuse of acronyms.    Handling Proliferation  129 
2. Goals 
In this section, the  viewpoint is,  at first, from  the inside of the chemical 
community; and second, it moves to inside of the larger scientific communi-
ty. Schummer, in an eloquent article in which he analyses statistical evidence 
from chemical papers, mentions near the end, almost as a summary that “the 
making  of  new  substances  is  actually  an  end  in  itself  in  chemistry.”9  Of 
course, he backs up this statement with ample data, and it has to be taken 
very seriously. 
  We ought to ask ourselves in which context this summary is adequate. 
The converse question, which also has to be answered, is whether there might 
exist other contexts in which this damning or condemning formula no longer 
applies.  
  First  then,  verification  and  explanation.  Schummer’s  formula  is  true,  I 
submit,  in  the  context  of  a  know-how,  of  chemistry  being  construed  by 
chemists as nothing else than a technical activity. It is quite easy to define the 
chemical know-how: it consists of the set of procedures and of the comple-
mentary  set,  of  the  characterization  of  new  compounds,  which  are  to  be 
found in the experimental parts of the publications. Such know-how thus is 
collected in data banks. And it is imparted to the budding chemist through 
teaching laboratories, as a student, and through some form of apprenticeship 
at the bench, in the laboratory, during preparation of the Ph.D. predominant-
ly. The first systematic organization for transmission of the chemical know-
how was arguably Liebig’s laboratory in Giessen.  
  Indeed, the main purpose of the chemistry laboratory, as devised by Lie-
big and as it has endured, is to train professionals for industry, primarily for 
the chemical and the pharmaceutical research laboratories. For instance, to 
consider the present situation, preparation of a Ph.D. in synthetic organic 
chemistry, during which the graduate student will prepare on the average two 
or three dozens new organic molecules, is the entrance ticket to an assured 
and well-paid job in the pharmaceutical industry.  
  We are thus led to complement Schummer’s formula. Rather than ‘being 
an end in itself’, the preparation of new substances is a mandatory certifica-
tion of a young chemist as a professional. It is the means by which the chem-
ical community transmits the necessary technical skills. In other words, in 
this day and age of the beginning of the 21
st century, the making of new 
chemicals is the equivalent to the masterpiece which artisans in guilds had to 
perform, in past centuries, to achieve their autonomy. 
  Now to the converse question of the existence of other contexts, in which 
Schummer’s formula would not apply. What jumps to mind, of course, is that 
chemistry goes beyond technical know-how, that it has also the dimensions 
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conceptually in textbooks rather than just manually in laboratories; it has a 
life  of  its  own,  with  constantly  reorganizing  fields  of  research,  with  their 
shifting boundaries; it is a problem-solving activity; and it aims at gaining an 
understanding of nature in  its protean  manifestations.10 In this context of 
chemistry as a science, Schummer’s formula may no longer be pertinent. I 
shall return to this point in a later section, dealing with the advancement of 
learning. 
  I hold science to be an attempt, constantly in need of being restarted and 
nourished, to provide a truthful narrative about the world. This definition is 
from the standpoint of a realist, believing the world to exist outside of my 
representation. Realism is indeed axiomatic, a matter of faith.  
  As for truthful description or representation, I hold this requirement to 
provide science with its ethos, with the horizon toward which it strives. For 
the purpose of this paper,  I shall use the easy criterion for truth of ‘that 
which is either impermeable to suspicion, or which successfully resists all at-
tempts at doubting and refuting’.  
  Hence, I shall take here a naïve view of truth, holding it as a value shared 
by citizens and by scientists alike. In other words, statements such as ‘the 
sum of the angles in a triangle equals two right angles’ or ‘citizens give them-
selves laws and institutions for the common good’ are both true as a matter 
of principle, within their frames of reference (Euclidean geometry and elec-
toral democracy), even if the latter may often be empirically faulty. 
  Accordingly, I hold as the chief value for a scientist to make a contribu-
tion: to propose a new and original view of the world, whether its scope is 
global or local. The task of the scientist is to advance our understanding. The 
scientist, just like the artist, has a duty to do original and creative work.  
  Since I hold it as a defining property, scientific work that does not strive 
for the truth is a contradiction in terms, an aberration. Unoriginal and uncre-
ative scientific work is morally wrong. These two statements follow, the one 
from my definition of science, the other from our living in a world of scarci-
ty. When a majority of mankind lives precariously, this last assertion does not 
need further elaboration. 
  That brings up a potential immorality, from abusing the trust placed in us, 
scientists, by our fellow-citizens. They agree to our enjoyment of the huge 
privilege of a shelter from scarcity, and of the derived privileges of the free-
dom of investigation, or of choosing only the kind of work bringing us per-
sonal  satisfaction  and  enjoyment,  in  return  for  our  gaining  greater  public 
knowledge about the world. Thus, a social contract provides the scientific 
endeavor with its moral foundation. A breach of this contract, such as per-
formance of a scientific task for one’s private and selfish enjoyment, with no 
return to the public, is in my view morally wrong.   Handling Proliferation  131 
  To sum up this statement of principles, a scientist is accountable both to 
the citizenry at large, s/he has a moral duty to come up with new results and 
to present them, to communicate and teach; and to the scientific community 
(peer review), in terms of the truth value of the assertions made about the 
world, since science moves from private personal representations to shared 
representations, attempting to be truthful. 
3. Chemical plagiarism 
Ancient Greek had an adjective, ‘plagios’, to denote obliquity, in both a geo-
metric and a figurative sense. ‘Plagios’ was also used to denote a person unre-
liable, lacking sincerity, someone practicing double-talk. Contemporary Eng-
lish usage has a somewhat similar expression, ‘a straight arrow’, to denote the 
converse  moral  qualities.  Latin  borrowed  from  ‘plagios’  a  name,  ‘plagium’, 
with the meaning of a con job, of appropriating something that does not be-
long  to  you.  A  derived  word,  ‘plagiarius’,  indicted  those  who  would  steal 
property, such as slaves, and make it their own. From that, we have derived 
the notion of plagiarism, as applied to the theft of intellectual property.  
  Plagiarism is rampant in chemistry, and this section is devoted to it, as 
considered from the viewpoint of science as a whole. A first question is: why 
plagiarism in chemistry? It will be followed by: where is the border between 
imitative and original work? And the third question is: what are some of the 
various forms of chemical plagiarism? 
  Why then would a chemist need or want to plagiarize already existing 
knowledge, embodied in molecules or in reactions? What makes such imita-
tive  work  special  to  chemistry  and  to  chemists?  Arguing  from  imitation 
through analogy, after all, is not special to chemistry. Other sciences, from 
mathematics to paleontology, including also astronomy, biology, or atmos-
pheric science also make heavy use of analogy. Metaphor is central to sci-
ence.11 
  I submit that the Periodic System of the elements is a major and perhaps 
the main thrust for the imitative behavior of chemists, in their discovery of 
new elements, new molecules, new materials, and new reactions. Mendeleev’s 
Periodic Table, in pointing to a deep harmony within matter, in setting-up 
families of elements, in providing chemists with a natural classification, also 
stands as a permanent invitation to imitative and derivative work. One may 
supplement this epistemic consideration with a sociological one. 
  Chemistry is a craft. It has remained so up to this day. In order to become 
a chemist, one serves one’s apprenticeship with a master chemist. The train-
ing includes reproduction by the apprentice of established procedures. To 132  Pierre Laszlo 
take but these two instances, carrying-out a Grignard reaction and monitor-
ing with a polarimeter the acid-catalyzed inversion of sucrose are two such 
ritualistic transmissions of a know-how, both practical (handiwork) and the-
oretical (transcribed in the form of chemical equations, also an integral part 
of the canonical corpus). 
  Now, to the second question: how to discriminate between routine, uno-
riginal or secondhand work and genuinely creative work? To be more specif-
ic, let us take a concrete example. There is an entire cottage industry of scien-
tists  involved  in  the  transposition  of  well-established  results  from  carbon 
(organic)  chemistry  to,  for  example,  the  chemistry  of  silicon,  or  that  of 
phosphorus. For instance, can one make the silicon analog to polyacetylene? 
Will it display interesting properties, in its electrical conductivity in particu-
lar? While such transfers – arguably the equivalent of translations from one 
language to another – are totally unimaginative in their conception, they may 
require extreme technical sophistication to be carried-out successfully. With-
in the profession, they are sometimes referred to, in rather deprecatory man-
ner, as ‘me-too chemistry’. There is also the often-quoted quip, by reference 
to organic chemists preparing a whole litter of kindred molecules, along the 
sequence of ‘methyl, ethyl, propyl, butyl, …, futile!’ 
  Let me rephrase the question: is it immoral to carry out derivative instead 
of original research, and where is the demarcation to be found or set? The an-
swer may be constructed from what these chemists would (and do) argue in 
justification of their approach. They would be likely to invoke the cumulative 
nature of scientific knowledge, the continuity of chemistry since the Lavoi-
sian Revolution, and the unpredictability of the relationships between future 
scientific advances and current knowledge. Furthermore, they would stress 
also accommodation with funding agencies. Basing themselves on peer re-
view, these are much more likely to honor research proposals seeded with 
promising  exploratory  results,  than  leaps  into  the  unknown.  Hence,  a  re-
search idea consisting in the preparation and the study of, say silicon nano-
tubes, is much more likely to be a winner than would have been, twenty years 
ago the preparation and study of carbon nanotubes. The latter became part of 
the field of chemistry and they entered chemical consciousness due to their 
serendipitous discovery. 
  My stand here, consistent with what I have already stated elsewhere,12 is 
(i) discovery is essential to the spirit of science; (ii) as a rule, discoverers op-
erate from marginal positions relative to the established disciplines and sub-
disciplines; (iii) ergo, it is advantageous to maintain a mainstream within each 
discipline, despite it being invariably totally sterile (and sterilizing), just so 
that innovators can become marginalized, or can choose such an uncomfort-
able position at the boundaries, i.e. in the no man’s land where discoveries 
cannot  fail  to  take  place.  A  reviewer  has  asked,  tongue-in-cheek,  if  one   Handling Proliferation  133 
should not then get rid of the mainstream entirely! But one cannot do with-
out, either, both for the training of young scientists and for the value of con-
trast. Imitation leads to creation. 
  Hence, the simplest criterion for demarcation between imitative and crea-
tive  chemical  research  identifies  with  the  border  between  mainstream  and 
frontier (or cross-disciplinary) science. Notice the paradox: the research sci-
entist performing standard, paradigmatic work may well turn out to be rep-
rehensible, from an ethical viewpoint (contributing to needless proliferation 
of chemicals, among other things); whereas the adventuresome research sci-
entist operating in front of the lines, in commando-like action, who opens up 
a new field of research, may well become exemplary, from the viewpoint of 
ethics.  
  There is another consequence, since human beings strive for acceptance 
within a community. Each of these polar opposites will tend to masquerade 
as the other type. The ‘me-too chemist’, the cynical practitioner of a phos-
phorus chemistry built entirely on borrowings from carbon chemistry, will 
describe – better yet, he will get someone else to do so, such as academies and 
prize-awarding  committees  –  his  results  as  ‘unusual’,  ‘revolutionary’, 
‘ground-breaking’,  or  yet  ‘unprecedented’,  all  manifestations  of  entrepre-
neurship  and  of  one-upmanship  currently  endemic  in  chemistry  journals. 
They are unambiguous signs of conformity and of behavior bordering on pla-
giarism. 
4. Neglect of personal improvement 
In this section, I appear to change tack. A major component of the alchemical 
quest was spiritual improvement. Why would chemistry, which has otherwise 
inherited so much from alchemy (procedures and apparatus, dualities such as 
that of analysis and synthesis: solve et coagula, symbolic representations, etc.) 
cut out this personal dimension?  
  The argument which I wish, if not to present in full, at least to summarize 
here,13 has for its first tenet that chemical science, whenever it sticks to em-
pirical facts, whenever it goes into theory-denial mode, thus foregoes cogni-
tion. Neglect of the advancement of learning – producing new chemical spe-
cies instead of producing authentic new knowledge, or not being intent upon 
making the two advances at the same pace – has a price. Chemists lacking in 
the cognitive fiber, as a consequence become morally deficient. Ultimately 
thus, a deficit in cognitive values turns into an ethical lapse. 
  Bypassing and neglecting the advancement of knowledge may result from 
overvaluing a practical goal, such as synthesis of a target molecule. Indeed, in 134  Pierre Laszlo 
her/his haste to get from A to B, i.e. to transform a primary material A into 
an intended product B, many a chemist won’t bother to scrutinize in their 
precise detail the intervening steps, won’t bother to study the mechanism and 
thus won’t even notice the occurrence of a number of intermediates K, L, M, 
N, … along the way. Yet, ‘God is in the details’. 
  Synthesis of B from A definitely improves the practical know-how. If it is 
the first time for the A-B conversion to have been effected, it adds a new 
route to those already charted. If this is the very first synthesis of B, this also 
contributes significantly to the know-how. If the A-B conversion was known 
already, this particular occurrence contributes to its public reproducibility. 
Yet, these all add to a practical know-how rather than they advance learning. 
They suffer from a lack of generality and from a surfeit of specificity.  
  Performance of an intended material transformation usually meets with 
admirable success, and this is one of the triumphs of modern chemistry. But 
at a rather high cost, when the doing excludes the learning; and when imposi-
tion of the chemist’s will upon the system prevents listening to the say of 
things.  I  cannot  help  but  sense  a  misunderstanding  when  fellow-chemists 
deem it a waste of their time to display idle curiosity. In so doing, they im-
munize  themselves  against  discovery.  I  submit  that  only  a  misreading  of 
chemical voluntarism would subdue and stifle chemical curiosity. 
  I submit too that keen observation of a reaction mixture, because it in-
volves cognitive skills, leads to the establishment of values, and thus to defin-
ing an ethical code for oneself. And this takes us back to alchemy! To the al-
chemist, to some alchemists at least, chemical transformations served as met-
aphors for a spiritual striving, a sublimation, a purifying of the soul, mortifi-
cation of the old self and a regeneration of the spirit. The chemical transfor-
mations taking place in the flask, the athanor, or the crucible, were illustra-
tions; they were outer models for the inner transformations of the adept, by 
spiritual alchemy. 
  This brings up the question of a link between cognitive and moral values. 
The former depend upon one’s epistemology. While a physicist may vouch 
for scientific realism, i.e. the truth of a theory will be to him the primary epis-
temic value, chemists are closer to being either pragmatists (truth is the hori-
zon toward which one strives) or instrumentalists (holding theories to be 
mere tools, without any truth content). Other chemists are either positivists 
(seeing is believing) or just want to stick to the empirical facts. My personal 
position  combines  that  of  the  instrumentalist  and  of  the  pragmatist  à  la 
Peirce or Putnam. 
  However, truth retains even more of a transcendent, metaphysical status 
by being an inaccessible value! As a chemist, I wish my statements to show 
better than just an empirical fit (predicted, calculated values matching ob-
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standing. As already stated, to me science is a groping for the truth. By hold-
ing on to such a cognitive value, truth being the beacon lighting one’s way, 
less ambitious standards, such as contenting oneself with a goodness of fit, to 
me smack of immorality. 
  What I am driving at might be rephrased, in the words of Hilary Putnam, 
as “some ethical principles at least are likely to have a large measure of objec-
tivity”.14 Or it might also be rephrased, in the context of modern chemistry 
rather than in that of alchemy, as an inducement to give oneself problem 
solving skills. These translate into increased self-assurance, better familiarity 
with one’s imagination, the ability to devise experimental tests for ideas, etc. 
These sum up into both an interconnection and interdependence between the 
material and the conceptual, which is conducive to personal improvement. To 
the effect of such a necessary link between scientific realism and ethics, I beg 
to be allowed to quote again Hilary Putnam:15 
It is because we are too realistic about physics, because we see physics (or 
some hypothetical future physics) as the One True Theory, and not simply as 
a rationally acceptable description suited for certain problems and purposes, 
that  we  tend  to  be  subjectivistic  about  descriptions  we  cannot  ‘reduce’  to 
physics. Becoming less realistic about physics and becoming less subjectivistic 
about ethics are likewise connected. 
5. The issue of language 
Why such a disinterest in  personal improvement?  The tribal identity of  a 
chemist is rooted in laboratory training and in a technical language, that of 
formulas. Both set him apart from non-chemists. 
  Beyond these platitudes, the chemist inhabits a world of values, that of 
the chemical community. And most chemists are chemists first. In this re-
spect, of a professional affiliation overruling and pushing into the shadow the 
other ones, secondary identities – as a scientist, as a citizen – chemists resem-
ble other professionals, such as lawyers or medical doctors. 
  The values of the group are dominant.16 Ethics, or the lack thereof, are 
those of the group. As is well known, such a renouncement to individual 
judgement and responsibility may have terrifying consequences. Yet, it is not 
a given:17  
[…] that the self has to find its moral identity in and through its membership 
in communities such as those of the family, the neighbourhood, the city and 
the tribe does not entail that the self has to accept the moral limitations of the 
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In general, though, belonging to the chemical community is gratifying, and 
has only mild and inoffensive side-effects.  
  A  comment  on  one  of  them  is  irresistible,  though.  Sharing  one’s 
knowledge with the citizenry is rarely a moral imperative for chemists, as it 
ought to be. Chemists, taken collectively, could not care less. They pay dear-
ly for their lack of interest in science communication. This is a major cause of 
chemophobia, on the part of the uninformed or misinformed public.  
  Disinclination on the part of chemists to popularize their knowledge is 
one of the causes of chemophobia, from a poorly informed public: this point 
brings up a more general issue, that of language. Chemists need and enjoy 
expressing themselves in their technical language, whose lexicon and syntax 
tend to remain opaque to nonchemists. Thus, chemists wrap themselves in a 
cocoon of their own making. The public reacts to the perception of its exclu-
sion (whether or not such perception is warranted is a moot point) with a 
counter-rejection; which is to describe once again one of the root causes of 
chemophobia. 
  Coming back to the chemical community and its use of an own language, 
its very activity, that of synthesis in particular, is a combinatorial art very 
much analogous to that of language itself. Hence, it should come as no sur-
prise if some chemists make new molecules just like advertising agencies try 
to introduce neologisms into the language. It should be no surprise, either, 
when a subset of such new molecules is equivalent to unneeded gibberish. 
Nor is it a surprise when, in like manner to the stereotypes and hackneyed 
phrases of ordinary language, chemistry has also its worn clichés and its uno-
riginal productions, out of conformity. 
  An illustration through analogy will suffice here. Take the word ‘beauty’. 
The English language supplements it with a small number of derived words, 
such as ‘to beautify’, ‘beautiful’, and ‘beautiless’. Some other words, also de-
rived from ‘beauty’ and well-formed according to linguistic rules, are only 
rarely used, and we do not perceive them as of any great necessity: ‘beau-
tydom’ and ‘beautyship’ are two such examples. A third class, that of nonex-
istent but well-formed words, such as ‘beautition’, ‘beautivity’, ‘beautisome’, 
‘beautirity’, ‘beauter’ and ‘beautor’, ‘beauture’ etc. are unnecessary and, for 
some of them, downright ugly: not all possible words need to be called into 
existence. An argument by analogy applies to new molecules and against their 
proliferation.   Handling Proliferation  137 
6. Advancement of chemical knowledge 
Above I have made the implicit point that chemical science does not proceed 
by the mere accumulation of new compounds. If so, what does it consist of?  
  Concepts. Imaginative concepts. Examples include the chemical bond, se-
lection rules for electrocyclic reactions, the delineation of hypersurfaces for 
chemical dynamics, and stereochemistry, for instance in organometallic com-
plexes. 
  Take as an example the chemical bond. It is a fiction; there is no such 
thing in nature. However, to conceive of atoms in molecules as held in pairs 
(sometimes in groups of three) by a bond which is furthermore generally to 
be associated with a pair of electrons according to Lewis and Langmuir, and 
to the Pauli Principle, is an imaginative leap which has made it possible to ra-
tionalize a vast amount of empirical data. The concept of a chemical bond fits 
nicely within the language of structural formulas as was devised in the 1850s 
and 1860s. It has led to many of the advances of chemical science during the 
20
th century. How? By work, individual (Linus Pauling, primus inter pares) 
and collective on this concept. 
  But what does it mean to work ‘on a concept’? I understand this phrase 
with the full meaning which Georges Canguilhem has endowed it with:18 
To work (on) a concept, is to vary its extension and what it comprehends, it is 
to generalize it through incorporation of exceptional features, it is to export it 
out of its original field, it is to take it as a model or conversely to seek a model 
for it, in short it is to give it gradually, though well-ordered transformations, 
the function of a form. 
The corpus of 20
th century studies of the chemical bond neatly qualifies, I be-
lieve, for the full-fledged work on a concept according to this exacting defini-
tion of Canguilhem’s. I go further: the task set forth by Canguilhem is equiv-
alent to a set of moral values, too.  
  So far in this paper, I have suggested that the cognitive aspect in chemical 
science is flavored with values – I put very high those of originality and of 
creativity – thus erecting moral principles for the chemist. But what about 
the converse? Could one not argue the disconnection of the moral from the 
cognitive dimension? 
  Indeed, the connection between the two spheres, the epistemological and 
the ethical, is often quite subtle.19 Some would argue for its nonexistence. As 
Ayer did point out,20 normative ethical judgements are synthetic; they are not 
reducible to empirical  judgements, whereas the only synthetic  judgements 
that can be objects of knowledge are empirical. This radical stand, altogether 
the opposite of mine, also goes against the whole Kantian tradition of epis-
temology, since synthetic judgements a priori are held by many as basic to 
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  My answer here is two-pronged: (i) it is ample time to separate the phi-
losophy of chemistry from that of physics; (ii) it is not because moral truth is 
not always easy to come by, when the empirical world reveals moral truth, 
that one should renounce making the effort.21 Yes, there is a discrepancy be-
tween scientific reductionism and philosophical thought, as embodied in eth-
ics.22 But one should attempt to bridge the gap. 
Conclusion 
Rather than describing moral lapses as extreme and exceptional behavior, I 
see them as an integral part of the fabric of chemistry and of the everyday ac-
tivity  of  chemists.  Are  they  a  consequence  of  hubris,  attendant  upon  the 
Promethean task of transforming matter? I submit instead that proliferation 
of chemicals, a direct consequence of the translation of chemical language not 
into action but into production – the two notions are not synonymous – be-
longs in the same region of the moral sphere as pollution. Innocent-seeming 
individual actions by a citizen (pollution) or by a chemist (proliferation) sum 
up,  overall,  as  threatening  life  forms  on  this  planet,  because  of  the  sheer 
numbers of people involved, and behaving irresponsibly.  
  To give it another description, proliferation of chemicals is a direct conse-
quence of the rat race in academia (‘publish or perish’) and of patent law in 
industry.  Both  the  career  and  the  business  imperatives  encourage  surface 
novelty, at the cost of true originality. We deal here with one of the numer-
ous manifestations of the ‘banality of evil’, to borrow Hannah Arendt’s felici-
tous oxymoron, by which she characterized Adolf Eichmann’s personality.23 
  But this need not be. Chemistry differs altogether from such a living cari-
cature, from the shadow it casts. Chemistry is a science and chemists are in-
deed natural scientists. Quite a few of us share an attitude of reverence for 
the wonders we are given to witness in our flasks. Reverence? The word, de-
rived from the Latin ‘uereri’, means etymologically something akin to reli-
gious respect, awe mixed with fear and forebodings. It is a cognate of the 
English adjective ‘wary’. A good chemist is one who turns admiration for the 
wonders of nature,24 into wariness about his/her interference with the real 
world; since as a rule a chemist goes beyond description, into action, when 
engaging in the téchne, the art of chemistry. 
  Indeed, the chemist’s attitude is not to be construed as one of passive ad-
miration for the intricate beauties of the real world, on a microscopic scale. 
Often s/he matches the whimsy of the imagination with the exuberant fanta-
sy of the natural forms. It is amazing that the two meet, in discovery. Such a 
chance encounter thus stems from the playful component. The chemist is at   Handling Proliferation  139 
play, with values combining the virtues of the Stoic with the ludic element, 
akin to and drawn from word games. 
  But of course, I am only paraphrasing here Kant, when he wrote at the 
end of his Critique of Practical Reason: 
Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing wonder and awe, the 
more  often  and  the  more  seriously  reflection  concentrates  upon  them:  the 
starry heaven above me and the moral law within me. 
Replace ‘starry heaven’ with ‘molecular playground’, and you have it, in a 
nutshell. 
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